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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
WELDON BASSETT and JUDY
BASSETT,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.

12727

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action charging the defendants and
each of them with Involuntary Manslaughter for the
death of their minor child.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Jury found both defendants guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm the judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Weldon and Judy were the parents of Erica Jean
.Bassett, who was approximately two and one-half months
old at the time of her death (T. 133-34).
On September 11, 1970, Judy Bassett gave birth to
a daughter, Erica Jean Bassett, at St. Benedict's Hospital
in Ogden, Utah. The baby was a breech birth, buttocks
first, but this was only a moderate problem (T. 120). Dr.
Rogers delivered the baby and testified it was not injured
and was a normal healthy baby (T. 121) . Dr. Rogers
further testified the child was healthy, normal and was
growing at its third week and sixth week checkups.
On November 8, 1970, the child was brought into the
pediatrics ward at McKay Hospital with a fever and convulsions (T. 123). There were bruises around the ear
of the child (T. 124). The child had lost weight since its
sixth week checkup (T. 128) and was kept in the hospital four days (T. 131). Dr. Rogers testified the problem of a battered child presented itself and under the law
the doctors filled out forms to report the matter to the
police (T. 131). They even tried to have the Juvenile
Court intervene and relieve the family of responsibility
of the child but were unsuccessful in doing so (T. 131).
The child was released to the parents but on November
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24, 1970, the child was admitted to St. Benedict's Hospital (T. 136). The child was dead.
An autopsy was performed on the child. The autopsy
showed five fractures involving four ribs (T.171), three
brain injuries, perhaps six bruises, (T. 175-185) on the
chest and both arms (T. 170) .
The Appellants, Weldon and Judy Bassett were accused and convicted of the crime of Involuntary Manslaughter. It is from this conviction the Appellants are
appealing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TR I AL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO GO TO THE JURY
AND TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT.
Involuntary Manslaughter as defined by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-30-5 (2) (1953) is as follows:
"(2) Involuntary in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death
in an unlawful manner or without due caution and
circumspection."
Utah case law defining the meaning is sparse. However, in State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P. 2d 457
(1939), an automobile homicide case, this Court outlined
the statute and its meaning. The first part of the statute
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"an unlawful act not amounting to a felony" was defined
by the Court when it stated:
"We think the 'unlawful act' that is, the infraction
must be done in such a manner as to more than
constitute a mere thoughtless omission or slight
deviation from the norm of prudent conduct." 91
P. 2dat 466.
In State v. Peterson, 116 Utah 362, 210 P. 2d 299
(1949), this Court added:
"We also stated therein that the 'unlawful act'
must be 'reckless or in marked disregard for the
safety of others.' The implication is that the nature of the unlawful act must be such that it has
the potentialities of injury to others." 210 P. 2d
at 230-1.
An analysis of the meaning of these cases and the
law derived therefrom show that an "unlawful act" may
be a significant omission or a deviation from the norm of
prudent conduct and it must be such that it has the potentialities of injury to others.
The second part of the statute which states, the commission of a lawful act which might produce death (1)
done in an unlawful manner, or (2) done without due
caution and circumspection was explained in Lingman,
supra, when it stated:
"The distinct characteristic . . . is that the act
must be one which has knowable and apparent
potentialities for resulting in death. If such an
act is done in an unlawful manner or without due
care and circumspection, the criminal negligence
is present." 91 P. 2d at 466.

5
Criminal negligence was defined by the court in
Howard v. State, 88 Oki. Cr. 4, 199 P. 2d 240 (1948), as
"the omission to do something which a reasonable or
prudent person would do, or the doing of something which
such person would not do under the circumstances surrounding the particular case." 199 P. 2d at 244.
In the case at bar, the trial court judge looked at
the evidence presented by the prosecution. This evidence
consisted of at least three brain injuries, perhaps as many
as six, but at least four broken ribs, bruises on the chest,
bruises on both arms, the child was in convulsions as a
result of injury on the 8th of November and new injuries
resulted in the death of the child by November 25th (T.
242).
The judge stated the parents had to exercise reasonable ordinary care to protect their children and the failure
to do this if it reached gross proportions would be enough
to convict the parents (T. 242-3). The case was then
submitted to the jury. No positive act is required, only
the omission to positively protect their children as is their
responsibility.
The defendants testified they had almost exclusive
control of the child from the time of its birth with some
minor exceptions (T. 304). Even on the minor occasions,
there was testimony they didn't notice anything unusual
about the child (T. 304). Any injury that occurred to
the infant would have to have occurred while the parents
were responsible according to their own testimony.
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Whether or not an omission or deviation from the norm
of prudent conduct existed to convict the defendants of
Involuntary Manslaughter rested with the jury.
Appellant claims there was no act nor intent offered
into evidence as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-20
(1953). The respondent has shown that no positive act
need occur but an omission may constitute the unlawful
act in Involuntary Manslaughter cases. Also Involuntary Manslaughter involves an unintentional killing, therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-20 (1953) is not applicable.
This Court in State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952
(1936), in a Voluntary Manslaughter case held the killing
must be intentional or wilful whereas an unintentional
killing results in Involuntary Manslaughter. 60 P. 2d at
956.
Appellants further allege the evidence does not support the jury verdict of guilty. Appellants point out many
things that remotely could have caused the injuries.
Appellants ignored the expert testimony of Dr.
Rogers to the effect the child suffered from high temperatures, loss of weight, bruises and convulsions (T. 123126). Dr. Rogers further testified that he and two other
doctors (Dr. Grant Way and Dr. James Hansen) tried
to get the Juvenile Court to intervene and relieve the
family of the responsibility of caring for the child until
the injuries were clarified (T. 131).
Dr. Weston testified as to the bruises, fractures and
hematomas on the child (T. 165-185). Dr. Weston fur-
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ther testified he believed these injuries were caused by
a person or persons (T. 188) and he found no other cause
of death (T. 188-189).
Dr. Grunnet testified as to the severity of the subdural hernatornas (T. 215-225).
There was other evidence presented that the child
was normal, healthy and happy while in the hospital on
its third and six week checkups and during the period
following November 8th.
This is not an intentional crime but one of negligence.
One where the parents have failed to provide the due caution and circumsection necessary to insure the life of a
small infant.
The evidence was more than mere speculation and
it was properly submitted to the jury for its determination. According to well settled rules of law it is within
the province of the jury to determine from all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the death of the infant
whether there was sufficient negligence as to render the
appellants guilty.
This Court has upheld this theory in State v. Read,
121 Utah 453, 243 P. 2d 439 (1952), in deciding a case
wherein defendant was convicted of Involuntary Manslaughter, held:
"The evidence, admittedly conflicting, and therefore a jury question unless reasonable minds could
arrive at no conclusion other than that there was
no criminal negligence, was obviously such that a
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jury reasonably could have concluded that a defendant's conduct was of that type required to
justify conviction on grounds of criminal negligence." 243 P. 2d at 440.
Reasonable minds could not arrive at only a conclusion there was no criminal negligence, therefore, this case
was properly submitted to the jury for its verdict and
ample evidence existed for the conviction returned by the
jury.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING I N ST RU CT I 0 N NO. 8, SE'ITING
FORTH THE ELEMENTS TO BE FOUND
BY THE JURY IN ORDER TO CONVICT
THE DEFENDANTS OF INVOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER.
Instruction No. 8 as given to the jury is as follows:
"No. 8
Before you can convict the defendant of the
crime of Involuntary Manslaughter you must find
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all
of the following elements of that crime.
1. That Erica Bassett was the lawful child
of the defendant under consideration and as such
the defendant was under an obligation to provide
ordinary protection. The protection that a parent
must provide need not be of exceptional or extra
careful or unusually wise type of protection, but
need only be in accordance with community minimal acceptable standards.
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2. That Erica Bassett died as a result of
head injuries caused by trauma and that the
trauma was administered while there existed a
child-parent relationship with the defendant under
consideration on or about the date alleged.
3. That the parent under consideration failed
to provide minimal protection for the child and
because of such failure the child received the
trauma that resulted in its death. A parent is not
a guarantor of the safety of a child but is required
to use ordinary reasonable care. The criminal law
does not punish a parent for negligent care of a
child unless that negligence is so gross as to
amount to wilful disregard for the consequences
and it must be under circumstances containing no
satisfactory excuse. While a parent may under
many circumstances reasonably trust the other
parent to provide protection, neither parent may
totally shift the duty to the other unless the circumstances appear to warrant such confidence.
If you believe that the evidence establishes
each and all of the essential elements of the
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty
to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if
the evidence has failed to so establish one or more
of said elements then you should find the defendant not guilty."

Appellants' contention is that there was no mention
of a requirement given that defendants committed an
unlawful act. The major fact appellants overlook is that
the whole instruction goes to an omission that in and of
itself is an unlawful act. That is, the appellants failed
to provide the requisite care to protect the life of their
child and are therefore grossly negligent. This is in com-
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plete agreement with the wording of the statute as is
shown in Point I. Appellants had complete control of
their child at all times, thus any injury had to occur while
there existed a child-parent relationship. Whether there
occurred a lawful act by appellants which might have
produced death in an unlawful manner or without due
circumspection was properly submitted to a jury for its
determination.
The instruction was properly given by the court and
was in harmony with the intent and meaning of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-30-5 (2) (1953).
CONCLUSION
The evidence was sufficient to submit the case to a
jury and allow them to find that the appellants were responsible for the death of their child while committing an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an
unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection.
The trial court correctly denied appellants' motion
for a directed verdict.
Instruction No. 8 concerning the elements necessary
to find the appellants guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter
was properly given by the trial court and is consistent
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with the meaning and intent of the law.
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of the
jury and the judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

